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THE FUTURE OF EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT
LIABILITY AFTER THE
RAVENSWOOD HOSPITAL INCIDENT:
REDEFINING THE DUTY TO TREAT?
Kristine Marie Meece"
INTRODUCTION
A teenage boy is critically injured on the streets of a large urban city.'
The victim of gang violence, he has been shot, and is hemorrhaging from
the wound.2 Knowing there is a hospital nearby, his friends assist the boy
as far as he can walk-to within one half block of the hospital's
emergency department (ED) entrance. There, the boy collapses on the
pavement in hypovolemic shock, rapidly bleeding to death.4 His friends
frantically dash into the ED, begging for medical assistance; however, no
doctors or nurses leave the hospital premises to tend to the victim, citing
a hospital policy that forbids staff from leaving the grounds to render care
in emergency situations off-campus.5 Instead, the ED staff call 911 and
instruct the boy's friends to await an ambulance.6 A police officer at the
*Comments Editor, DEPAuL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CE L S. ., Un crstty of
Illinois, 1994; J.D. (Cand.) DePaul University College of Law, 2000.
'See Lola Smallwood, Witnesses SayHosp italRef sed to Help Dying Teen, CHLTUB., May
18, 1998, Metro Chicago, at 1; Dateline NBC: Chicago Hope? (NBC television broadcast, June
2, 1998); CBS This Morning (CBS television broadcast, May 19, 1998).
2See Marcus Franklin, Local Hospitals Would Have Helped Boy, DAYT'O.% DAiLY NES,,
May 25, 1998, Metro Today, at 1B; Smallwood, supra note 1, at Metro Chicago 1; CBS This
Morning, supra note 1.
'See CBS This Morning, supra note 1.4See id.
5See id.
6See Raveim'ood: A Dilemma for All Risk Managers, HEALTHcA E RiSi ANAGEME'J,
July, 1998; Smallwood, supra note 1, at Metro Chicago 1; CBS Thts Morning, supra note I.
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scene eventually manages to assist the boy inside the ED.7 However,
within minutes he succumbs to his fatal injury. 8
This scenario is a true story that occurred in May 1998 at
Ravenswood Hospital (Ravenswood) in Chicago, Illinois.9 The boy's
name was Christopher Sercye (Sercye).' 0  Since the incident,
Ravenswood's policy mandating that staff must not leave the premises to
care for a patient has been severely criticized." In response, hospital
officials state that contrary to some accusations, Ravenswood staff did not
callously refuse to render care to the boy.'2 Although they have revised
their policy since this incident, hospital administrators maintain that it
served two very important purposes: protecting staff from potentially
violent situations on the street, and maintaining their duty to care for ED
patients already inside the hospital.' 3 Moreover, Ravenswood asserts that
it was not an appropriate medical center for treating Sercye due to the
emergent surgical nature of his injuries. 14 Even if the boy had been in an
ambulance, Ravenswood would have been bypassed in favor of one of the
Chicago area trauma centers because Ravenswood is not equipped to
handle the type of injuries sustained by Sercye.15 Finally, there is no
Illinois state or federal law stating that emergency department staff must
leave hospital grounds to care for emergency victims.' 6
7See Ravenswood: A Dilemmafor All Risk Managers, HEALTHCARE RISK MANAGEMENT,
July, 1998.
"See id.
9See Smallwood, supra note 1, at Metro Chicago 1; CBS This Morning, supra note 1.
l'See Ravenswood: A Dilemma for All Risk Managers, HEALTHCARE RISK MANAGEMENT,
July, 1998.
"See Franklin, supra note 2, at Metro Today 1 B; Ravenswood, supra note 6; Dateline NBC,
supra note 1; CBS This Morning, supra note 1.
"See Practice Medicine, Not Law, C. SUN-TIMES, May 19, 1998, Editorials, at 23.
"See Ravenswood, supra note 6.
'
4See Kathryn J. McIntyre, Commentary: Make Common Sense Part ofthe Policy, BUS, INS.,
May 25, 1998, at 53.
'sSee Dateline NBC, supra note 1. Ravenswood Hospital would have been bypassed by an
ambulance in favor of one of Chicago's level I trauma centers that are properly equipped and
staffed twenty four hours a day to handle traumatic surgical emergencies like Sercyc's. See Chris
Petrakos, ER Admission Policies Addressed, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 7, 1998, Nursing News, at 3
(describing the difference between level I trauma centers and other hospitals within the Emergency
Medical Services network).
'
6See generally, John Blair, Commentary: Working Toward a FullRecovey: Hospital CEO
Gets Crash Course in Crisis Management After Boy's Death, MODERN HEALTHCARE, July 13,
1998, at 36 (discussing no formal obligation to treat an individual not on hospital property).
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Responding to threats from the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) that their Medicare participation would be
discontinued unless the policy was immediately revoked, Ravenswood
amendedthe policy.'7 The revised policy provides for designated hospital
staff to be "on-call" twenty-four hours a day to render emergency care to
patients in the "immediate vicinity" of the hospital.' 8
It is true that no Illinois or federal law exists that mandates
emergency departments render emergency care to patients off hospital
grounds. Therefore, Ravenswood staff acted within the law by refusing
to treat Sercye. However, there remain some unresolved issues in light of
the Ravenswood incident regarding the future of emergency department
liability. The Background section describes the federal Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) as it currently
applies to emergency situations. The Analysis section includes arguments
about whether liability under EMTALA could be extended to cases such
as the Ravenswood incident. In addition, the Analysis section discusses
whether, despite EMTALA, public policy requires hospitals to take on
responsibility for emergency situations arising in the "immediate vicinity"
of the grounds. The Impact section identifies potential problems
Ravenswood may encounter in implementing its new policy, as well as
whether the Illinois Good Samaritan Act 9 can offer protection to staff
who render assistance in a situation similar to that of Christopher Sereye.
BACKGROUND
The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
EMTALA is a federal statute that imposes a duty on hospitals receiving
federal funding to provide appropriate medical screening to any patient
who comes to the ED seeking treatment." If the ED determines that an
emergency medical condition' exists, the hospital must provide for either
"See HCFA Approves Change After ER Controvers, HEALTHCARE RjSR MA'AGEME.T
Aug., 1998, at 102.
'$Petrakos, supra note 15, at Nursing News 3.
19745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 4912-15 (West 1998).
70 See Johnson v. University ofChi. Hosp., 982 F.2d 230,233 n.7 (7th Cir. 1992); 42 U.S C.
§ 1395dd (1998).
""Emergency medical condition" is defined in the statute as "a medical condition
manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the
absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result i-i) pL cng the
1999]
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such treatment as required by the condition, or, if that ED is not capable
of rendering the required treatment, for transfer of the patient to a
qualified medical facility once the individual is stabilized.22 Originally,
the statute was passed to prevent hospitals from making treatment
decisions based on a patient's ability (or inability) to pay -- a practice that
had become epidemic in the United States prior to EMTALA's
23enactment. Referred to as "dumping," emergency departments denied
treatment or transferred patients to other hospitals if they were unable to
pay the bill, without regard for the patient's physiologic condition.24
Violations ofEMTALA are punishable by individual civil personal injury
lawsuits for actual damages, as well as civil monetary penalties of not
more than $50,000 per violation. 5
ANALYSIS
To establish a violation of EMTALA, a plaintiff must prove three things:
the hospital in question is covered by the statute, the patient arrived at (or
"came to") the hospital seeking treatment, and either the hospital did not
properly screen the patient or the hospital sent the patient away before
stabilizing the condition. 6 A hospital is covered by EMTALA if it
receives federal funding.27 Since Ravenswood Hospital receives Medicare
funding, it is covered by EMTALA. However, there are no cases that
directly address the issue of whether EMTALA applies to emergency
victims who are within close proximity to, but not physically on hospital
property. 8 Furthermore, no litigation has come out of the Ravenswood
incident. If litigation were commenced, the issue of Ravenswood's
liability would turn on a court's definition of when a patient "comes to"
the ED for purposes of EMTALA. Some of the following contentions
concerning EMTALA could foreseeably be made.
health ofthe individual... in seriousjeopardy, (ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (iii)
serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part." 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1998),
2'See id.
2'SeeJohnson, 982 F.2d at 233 n.7.24See id.
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1998).26See id.27See Johnson v. University of Chi. Hosp., 982 F.2d 230, 232-33 (7th Cir. 1992).
2'It has been asserted that if an individual is not on hospital property, EMTALA regulations
are not applicable. See W. Richard Bukata, Patient Transfer Regulations-1998 Update,
EMERGENCY MED. & ACUTE CARE ESSAYS, Sept. 1998.
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A plaintiff might argue that EMTALA applies to the hospital in this
situation by interpreting the statute broadly. With a broad interpretation
of EMTALA, one could argue that the statute encompasses any patient
requesting medical assistance, regardless of location. In this regard, a
plaintiff could argue that a victim's mere request for medical assistance
satisfies the "coming to" requirement of EMTALA, and that actual
physical presence inside the ED is not required for a patient to qualify for
emergency assistance under the statute. For example, Sercye's friends
arrived at the ED begging for help. 29 A plaintiff could argue that those
pleas couldbe construed as Sercye's request for assistance, which satisfies
the "coming to" element of the statute; therefore, the hospital should be
held liable.
The defense might argue that a patient "comes to" the ED when he
physically arrives inside the doors of the hospital, and urge a narrow
interpretation of EMTALA. In this regard, a Seventh Circuit ease could
be cited where apatient who was never physically inside a hospital facility
was held not to have "come to" the ED for purposes of EMTALA. In
Johnson v. University of Chicago Hospitals,"0 the defendant hospital
declined to accept a patient into its ED through the emergency medical
system's telemetry system operator because the hospital had declared
itself on "partial bypass."3' Paramedics had contacted the defendant
hospital requesting authorization to bring an emergency victim to its ED,
which was only five blocks from the scene."2 However, the hospital
instructed the paramedics to take the patient to another hospital, and the
patient died during the transfer.33 The court, in construing EMTALA, held
that since the patient was never physically present at the hospital, that she
never "came to" the hospital for purposes of EMTALA liability.14
Therefore, EMTALA was not applicable, and the hospital was not liable
under the statute.35
A hospital in Ravenswood's situation might attempt to escape
EMTALA liability by analogizing Johnson to the facts. Like the plaintiff
patient in Johnson, Christopher Sercye, although very close to the ED
'9See Practice Medicine, Not Law, supra note 12, at 23.
3"Johnson, 982 F.2d at 230.
"See id. at 231.
3See id.
"See id.
34See id. at 233.
"See Johnson, 982 F.2d at 233.
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entrance, was never actually on hospital property. 6 Therefore, a hospital
could argue that like the Johnson case, the statute does not apply; thus
escaping liability.
A plaintiffmight distinguish Johnson on its facts and say that the two
situations are completely different because in Johnson, the patient was
already inside an ambulance, receiving medical attention, and en route to
the appropriate facility within the emergency medical service network. 7
In the present situation, however, Sercye was lying just feet from the only
ED available to him, and had no medical personnel tending to his care.3 8
Therefore, a plaintiff would argue that the court was correct in denying
EMTALA liability in Johnson, but should apply it to the present facts
because Sercye received no medical attention while en route to the
hospital.39
A plaintiff could also say that even if a court were to hold that Sercye
did not "come to" the hospital for purposes of EMTALA, public policy
demands that EMTALA be extended such that ED staffshould be required
to administer care to someone in need of emergency care who is in close
proximity to hospital grounds. For example, as one editorial stated, "rigid
adherence [to Ravenswood's policy of not leaving hospital premises]
seems absurd when a person lies wounded such a short distance from
emergency room personnel., 40 Even Ravenswood Hospital's president
and chief executive officer admitted that he believes "the policy did not
work in the spirit in which it was written 4  more than a decade ago.... ,41
The policy, according to some, became "dysfunctional" 43 at the point
where staffers observed strict adherence to it instead of saying, "[s]crew
6See Franklin, supra note 2, at Metro Today IB; Dateline NBC, supra note I;CBS This
Morning, supra note 1.
"'See Johnson v. University of Chicago Hosp., 744 F. Supp. 510 (Ill. 1991).
3SSee Smallwood, supra note 1, at Metro Chicago 1.
"See id.
4
°Mclntyre, supra note 14, at 53.
"Ravenswood Hospital's policy was originally written for the dual purpose of protecting
hospital staff from potentially dangerous situations on the street and to ensure that its current ED
patients were properly attended. Neither of these situations was of such concern on the day of
Sercye's death that the policy required strict adherence. See Ravenswood, supra note 6.
42Bruce Japsen, Callfor Common Sense: Hospitals RethinkPolicies After ER Denies Dying
Boy Care, MODERN HEALTHCARE, May 25, 1998 at 24.
4 Bob Groves, Teen's Death Outside ER Poses Dilemma for Hospitals, THE RECORD, May
20, 1998, News, at LO1.
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policy, I'm getting that kid in here NOW." 4" Other commentators
expressed that "compassion should have overruled fears of litigation...
[and] any attempt... to save the boy's life would have been in keeping
with the oath they took when they became doctors and nurses.' '4
The defense might assert that public policy does not mandate that
EMTALA be extended. In this regard, the hospital might say that to adopt
such public policy would be to possibly abandon patients in the ED and
expose staff to potentially dangerous situations on the streetfr
Considering Ravenswood Hospital's location in Chicago's inner city, it
is not unreasonable to think that the violence that so often plagues the
streets would also surface around the campus of the hospital. Moreover,
the argument concerning difficulty defining "immediate vicinity" could
be presented. "Just how far the victim is from the hospital becomes a
logistical problem for staff members," and is a slippery slope
consideration.47 Is the immediate vicinity one block, within shouting
distance, two blocks, one hundred yards, across the street, or vAthin seeing
distance? The hospital could argue that the problem of implementation is
unreasonable, and that hospitals should be free to decide whether to adopt
policies like their new one, not be forced to do so.
A plaintiff may retort by pointing out that other states, such as
Minnesota, have Good Samaritan laws that actually require witnesses to
render "reasonable assistance."4 8 In other states, such as Massachusetts
and New Jersey, many hospitals have policies of aiding anyone in need of
medical assistance both inside the hospital and on adjacent streets,49 and
that Illinois law should be amended to require the same.
Ravenswood hospital could try to circumvent EMTALA completely
by arguing that the present situation is not what Congress had in mind
when they enacted the statute. Since EMTALA was originally enacted to
prevent hospitals from "dumping" patients who are unable to pay, and
44MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 (1998); Richard Roeper, In Mahe of Chicago Case, Me Nccd
"Good Samaritan" Law, STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER, May 24, 1998, Editorials, at 21
4 Practice Mledicine, Not Law, supra note 12, at 23.
"These two considerations were precisely the problems that Ravenswood's original policy
sought to prevent. See Petrakos, supra note 15, at 3.
47Groves, supra note 43, at L01.
"See Roeper, supra note 44, at 23.
"'See Groves, supra note 43, at LO1; Jessica Heslam, Local ER Stqfos Can Treat Outside.
Chicago Death Appalls Hospitals, THE PATRIOT LEDGER, May 20, 1998, News, at 12.
"
0See Johnson, 982 F.2d at 233.
1999]
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since Ravenswood did not deny treatment to Sercye based on his financial
status, a defendant could argue that EMTALA is completely inapplicable
to this situation.
IMPACT
Whatever the result of any litigation that ensues as a result of the
Ravenswood Hospital incident, the impact may be extreme. If a court
were to extend EMTALA liability, Illinois hospitals would immediately
encounter problems if their policies did not provide for care of off-campus
patients in need of emergency treatment. Conversely, if a court were to
refuse to apply EMTALA to the situation at hand, hospitals state-wide
could feasibly circumvent the statute in similar situations in the future.
5
'
Although there has been no litigation to date, in March 1999,
Ravenswood Hospital signed a mutual agreement with the inspector
general of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). 2
Pursuant to the agreement, Ravenswood Hospital was fined forty thousand
dollars for allegedly violating EMTALA; however, the hospital admitted
no wrongdoing in the matter.53 The agreement also provides that the
hospital will "remind the community that it accepts all patients with
emergency medical conditions. It promised to buy two quarter-page
advertisements over the next year in Sunday editions of the Chicago Sun-
Times declaring that Ravenswood examines patients 'without delay and
regardless of their ability to pay."' 54 Thus, EMTALA may have already
been effectively extended.
Notwithstanding Ravenswood's agreement with DHHS or a court's
future ruling on the issue, HCFA has also demonstrated that it also has the
power to extend applicability of EMTALA by threatening to kick
"It is not outrageous to consider the possibility that this sort of situation could happen
again. Ravenswood's chief executive officer indicated thatjust since the revision of the ED policy
to include service to the immediate vicinity, there have been several occasions on which ED staff
had to leave the premises to attend emergency situations at least one block away. See Petrakos,
supra note 15, at 3.
"See Hospital That Didn't Treat Teen is Fined, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 13, 1999, News, at 5;
Hospital That Failed to Aid Dying Teen to Pay $40,000, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 13, 1999,
National/Foreign, at A21.
"See id.
S4Hospital that Failed to Aid Dying Teen to Pay $40,000, supra note 52, at A2 1.
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Ravenswood out of the Medicare system." Based on HCFA's
requirement, Ravenswood would not be civilly liable for refusing to treat
an off-campus emergency victim (as they would if they were in direct
violation ofEMTALA). 6 However, HCFA is responsible for determining
hospitals' eligibility for Medicare reimbursement, which is a substantial
percentage of a hospital's income.5 7 Therefore, by threatening to
discontinue Medicare participation, HCFA's demand is the functional
equivalent of extending EMTALA to require ED staff to render
emergency care to victims at off-campus locations.5 3
Aside from other issues, Ravenswood's revised policy presents
inherent problems in implementation. First, the new policy states that two
ED personnel59 are available twenty-four hours a day to provide
emergency assistance to anyone requesting it in the "immediate
vicinity."60  However, the term "immediate vicinity" is ambiguous.
Therefore, staff will not know in what situations they will be required to
leave hospital grounds to render emergency care. The potential for
litigation in this regard is obvious. If a patient needs care who is one
block away, he will most likely receive it. However, what about a patient
who is three blocks away? It is foreseeable that patients in the gray area
of "immediate vicinity" who are denied emergency care by the hospital
may sue to recover damages for harm suffered as a result of not having
'
5See supra note 17, at 102. See also Ravenswood, supra note 6 (stating that HCFA
threatened to cancel Ravenswood's Medicare participation within a month unless the hospital
could prove it had changed the policy that led to the incident).
56See supra note 17, at 102; 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1998).
rSee Dateline NBC, supra note 1 (stating that Ravenswood hospital was at risk of losing
S48 million dollars in Medicare funding).
"
8This effect leads to the question of whether HCFA's demand is legally recognizable. If
legislators had intended EMTALA to apply to situations arising off hospital grounds, they would
have so indicated in the language of the statute. Amendments to federal legislation require much
more than a demand from one entity. Regardless of whether hospitals may be held civlly liable
under EMTALA for refusing to render care off-site, the practical effect of HCFA's action is that
EMTALA is effectively extended such that emergency departments now have a duty to trcat
victims in the immediate vicinity. If this duty is breached, hospitals face forfeiture of Medicare
reimbursement.
9One physician and one staff nurse will respond to off-site emergencies. Sce supra note
17, at 102.
6 See id.
1999)
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received emergency medical care to which they may have been entitled
under the hospital's policy.61
Other problems in implementation include what equipment the staff
is expected to carry with them to off-campus emergencies. There is no
way to foresee the individual needs of emergency patients, except that
suction, oxygen, medications, and other durable medical equipment is
often required.62 These items are heavy and cumbersome to carry,
regardless of the distance they must be carried. Additionally, should the
staff be required to take a wheelchair or stretcher with them to every off-
site situation? These considerations conjure up the image of two staffers
scrambling to gather pieces of equipment and then running down the street
attempting to push it or carry it on their backs, getting wheels stuck in
potholes and tripping over cracks in the sidewalk. One may justifiably
wonder if bringing equipment and supplies to remote locations is practical
at all. What then, if anything, should staff bring with them to these
situations is a question to be given consideration.
Another consideration is whether hospital staff is expected to
transport off-site emergency victims into the ED. The possibility that a
patient has sustained neck and back injuries must be taken into account if
he is to be moved. According to Ravenswood's chief executive officer,
staff have brought patients inside themselves since the new policy became
effective.63 However, a nurse from one suburban hospital has expressed
a different view on transporting patients from outside the premises to the
ED, stating that while she has several certifications, they do not include
transport-nursing. 64 "That is something I would have to be cognizant of:
61Chicago aldermen proposed several city ordinances which would define the boundaries
of "immediate vicinity." One proposal would require hospitals to treat emergency patients within
1,000 feet of the hospital. Another proposal would strip hospitals' general business licenses and
impose fines of$1000 on hospitals who refuse to treat patients within 150 feet of the facility. Sce
Practice Medicine, Not Law, supra note 45, at 23.
""Crash carts" equipped with automatic defibrillators, cardiac monitors, and other supplies
for cardiac arrest, for example, are very large, heavy and cumbersome to push down a hallway.
Imagine trying to push one down a bumpy and busy street in the rain or snow.
"See Petrakos, supra note 15, at 3.
'Certification provides a mechanism whereby nurses can validate their expertise and
demonstrate accountability to the public. It is required by some health care institutions in order
to perform certain specialized nursing tasks. The American Nurses' Association offers
certification for various areas of nursing, such as neonatal, operating room, oncology, and
transport. Certain levels of expertise, education, experience, and examination scores are required
to receive status as a certified specialty nurse. See SUZANNE C. SMELTZER and BRENDA G. BARE,
BRUNNER AND SUDDARTH'S TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL-SURGICAL NURsING 12 (7th ed. 1992).
[Vol. 3: 101
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practicing outside my scope.' ' 65  Thus another dilemma is
presented-whether nurses who render emergency care to patients off-site
should be certified in transport-nursing. This consideration cannot be
ignored, because if bringing a patient in from an off-campus location is
considered a "transport" and staff are not transport-nursing certified, it
places them in the position of practicing outside the scope of their
licenses, which potentially opens them and the hospital up to negligence
liability.66
Still another potential problem is hospitals with large campuses. At
Ravenswood hospital, for example, some parts of the campus are two
blocks from the ED.67 Larger medical center campuses often span several
city blocks, which poses an obvious question. What happens when a
person in need of emergency assistance is just one block away from
hospital grounds, but that person is four or five blocks from the ED? Are
staff expected to traverse four or five city blocks to assist that patient?
Certainly, by the time staff have traveled that far while pushing and/or
carrying heavy equipment, they will be fatigued. Then the possibility
exists that fatigue will affect their performance in rendering care.
Furthermore, the equipment must be returned to the hospital. By the time
the staff get back to the ED, they could be too fatigued to effectively care
for their ED patients.
The underlying rationales behind Ravenswood's oldpolicy cannotbe
ignored, either. First, the interest of protecting staff from potentially
violent situations outside the hospital is a real and valid concern." Given
the large number of violent crimes committed in large cities like Chicago,
the safety of staffwho are called to assist in off-campus emergencies must
be given due consideration. 69 The potential for danger presents the
question of how staff should assess the potential risks associated with
entering a particular area to deliver emergency care. Should hospital
security be summoned to scan the area before staff leaves the building?
Should staffers have the option of determining the relative safety of the
situation themselves once they have arrived on the scene? What, if during
65Petrakos, supra note 15, at 3.
6
'See id.
67See id.
6SSee id.
69It is common knowledge that in some areas of Chicago, for example, %,hile one particular
city block may be relatively safe in terms of gang "territory" and activity, the very next block may
be plagued with unlawful activity and therefore present a very real danger to the public. Sece id
1999]
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the course ofthe treatment, a violent situation arises: will staff be expected
to remain with the patient, or should they flee the area? The potential for
violence can only be determined on a case-by-case basis, and it seems
elementary that under no circumstances should staff be sent out to face a
potentially violent situation. However, it is very unclear what the scope
of the staff s obligations to the patient would be if violence were to arise
at the off-site location.
The second rationale behind Ravenswood's old policy is the
hospital's duty to treat ED patients who are already inside the hospital.7"
"The safet of the patients already in the emergency department should be
the hospital's first priority."7' For people to go outside, therefore, proper
staffing in the ED must be available to replace the nurse and physician
who left.72
How, then, will Ravenswood reconcile the important interests served
by its old policy with the new policy? The director of clinical
administrative emergency services for the Metropolitan Chicago Health
Care Council indicated that the hospital's guidelines should take into
account the services available through the Emergency Medical Services
(EMS) system, and that responders from hospitals should only be
summoned in true emergencies. 73 The president and chief executive
officer of Ravenswood Hospital, John E. Blair, stated that their first
response is to call 911. 74 "The second response, depending on the
proximity, is to either go to the site with either emergency personnel or
security personnel. If it is three or four blocks away, we send a security
guard with a walkie-talkie and he's going to let us know what is going on
while waiting for 911." 75 Mr. Blair went on to say that on the few
occasions since the new policy was enacted that staff actually went to the
scene, they assessed the situation "and either waited for 911 or brought the
patient in" themselves.76 It remains to be seen how the potential problems
that staffers will encounter in continuing to implement their policy will be
resolved.
7'See Petrakos, supra note 15, at 3; Blair, supra note 16, at 36.71Petrakos, supra note 15, at 3.72See id.
'
3See id.74 See id.
7'See id.
76Petrakos, supra note 15, at 3.
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It is worth noting that physicians and nurses may harbor legitimate
fears of civil liability associated with "bad" outcomes of treatment
rendered at off-site locations. It is easy to imagine an emergency situation
at a remote location where equipment fails, or the required equipment and
supplies are not available, and the patient dies or sustains permanent
injuries as a result. The question arises whether the Illinois Good
Samaritan Act 77 (the Act) could provide a shield from liability for this type
of situation. The Act was promulgated as protection for health care
providers who volunteer their services in emergency situations, and was
intended to "encourage persons to volunteer their time and talents.., to
help others. ' S It does not impose an affirmative duty to render emergency
care, but shields from liability those health care professionals who, in
good faith and without prior notice of the illness or injury, offer
emergency assistance without fee to a victim.79 However, the Act will
probably not afford staff protection from civil liability in a case where a
hospital has implemented a policy whereby staff are required to render
off-site emergency assistance. In that scenario, because staff would be
paid for their services rendered, the Act would probably not apply. A
hospital could attempt to circumvent this problem simply by not billing
the patient for care received at an off-site location. However, it remains
to be seen whether a court would afford "Good Samaritan" protection to
hospital staff in that situation.
A final consideration is if a court were to hold that from a policy
standpoint, hospital emergency departments must render assistance to
victims in the immediate vicinity of hospital grounds, there arises an issue
of whether only ED staff are under this duty. What about a case where the
ED cannot spare any staff to go off-campus-- will other hospital staff be
pulled from their units to attend the situation or to care for the ED staff s
patients while the ED staff is outside? What about when an accident
occurs outside a physician's office? Will those doctors be required to go
outside and assist? What if the accident occurs outside the physician's
home? If, from a policy standpoint, a court determines that an emergency
department has a duty to treat off-site victims, it is impossible to tell at
what point on the slippery slope the duty to treat will end.
'n745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 4912-75. (West 1998).
71745 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 4912. (West 1998).
79See 745 ILL. CoMP. STAT. A,\NN. 4912-75. (West 1998). The only exception to the Act is
for willful or wanton misconduct. See id.
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CONCLUSION
The future of emergency department liability is uncertain after the
Ravenswood Hospital incident. It is certainly true that from one
standpoint, to leave a boy dying in the street just feet away from a hospital
emergency room seems like a cold disregard for human life. However, the
rationales underlying Ravenswood's old policy are sound. As the Impact
section illustrates, imposing a rule that would force emergency department
staff to leave hospital grounds in every potential off-campus emergency
presents many practical problems in implementation, not to mention
considerable safety issues. It seems, therefore, that the most logical
approach is to allow hospitals to formulate their own policies. To do this,
a hospital should consider many variables such as the size of its campus
and the location of its ED therein, the hospital's geographic location
within a city, its placement within the emergency medical services
network, the availability of staff, and the probability of staff encountering
violence on the street. These considerations should be balanced and dealt
with on a case-by-case basis by hospitals to ensure the safety for all
involved.
Notwithstanding any legal/liability issues, HCFA may have already
redefined and extended the duty to treat by threatening revocation of
Medicare participation. 80 By demanding that Ravenswood assure them
that a similar incident will never happen again, HCFA has set up a
punishment system that, in implementation, effectively extends
EMTALA's duty to include mandatory treatment of patients in the
immediate vicinity of hospital grounds.8' As described in the Impact
section, a blanket rule such as this has many problems that must be dealt
with on a case-by-case basis. The practical effect ofHCFA's demand may
be that hospitals sacrifice quality in-patient care and the safety of their
staff in order to ensure that Medicare reimbursement is never revoked.
This consideration is compounded and complicated by Ravenswood's
agreement with DHHS.82 Following the Ravenswood Hospital incident,
the duty to treat seems ambiguous and has very unclear boundaries. It is,
therefore, a grave situation that hospitals, staff, and patients are faced with
from this point forward.
8 See supra note 17, at 102.
8 See id.
82See supra note 52.
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